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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE COURT: Good morning. 3 DEPUTY COURTROOM CLERK: Your Honor, this is the time set for hearing in Civil Case 12-2265-SI. United 4 5 States of America v. City of Portland. 6 Counsel, beginning with plaintiff, would you please 7 identify yourself for the record? MS. BROWN: Adrian Brown for the United States. 8 9 MR. GEISSLER: Jonas Geissler, Civil Rights 10 Division, DOJ, for the United States. 11 If Your Honor please, we would have one specific 12 factual notation to make on the record before His Honor 13 reads his opinion. 14 THE COURT: Sure. 15 MR. WILLIAMS: Good morning, Your Honor, Bill Williams on behalf of the United States. 16 17 MS. ALBIES: Good morning, Your Honor, 18 Ashlee Albies on behalf of intervener -- proposed intervener 19 Albina Ministerial Alliance and with me is Shauna Curphey. 20 MR. KARIA: Good morning, Your Honor. Anil Karia 21 on behalf of proposed intervener Portland Police 22 Association. 23 THE COURT: And how are you feeling, Mr. Karia? 24 MR. KARIA: I feel better.

THE COURT: I'm glad to see you here.

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MS. OSOINACH: Good morning, Your Honor, Ellen Osoinach on behalf of City of Portland.

MR. VAN DYKE: Good morning, Your Honor, Jim Van Dyke on behalf of the City of Portland.

THE COURT: Good morning. The United States may proceed.

MR. GEISSLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

We understand Your Honor has written in an email correspondence to counsel in this case that the Court has already issued -- already offered an opinion. Your Honor, we would like to make one specific notation to preserve the record. Your Honor, the United States unconditionally and unequivocally waives any specific cause of action against PPA members or the PPA for the sake of the specific §14141 cause of action in this particular case.

That's not to say that should -- in the future, should any cause of action arise either criminally or civilly, based upon past or future comment, that the cause of action would be waived; but, rather, for the sake of this case, we believe this case is restructured such that it would exclude the PPA for the sake of the merits phase of this cause of action.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. GEISSLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

That doesn't necessarily affect how I view things right

now, because my tentative thinking is not to address and to defer ruling on the merits issues relating to the motion to intervene. In a few moments — let me share with you my tentative thinking on the pending motions to intervene and where we go from here. I will concede and be candid that tentative probably understates the degree of my thinking on this, but I will allow you all to let me know whether you think I've made any factual or legal mistakes in my tentative analysis, but what I'm planning on doing is ruling on the pending motions to intervene for purposes of the remedy phase and the remedy phase only and deferring any ruling on any motions to intervene with respect to the liability phase. We may or may not ever get there. So I want to take things one step at a time.

After I share with you my analysis on the motions to intervene with respect to the remedy phase, I'll share with you my analysis of where we should go from here. And then I will open it up for any comments that you all wish to make.

But I want to begin -- frankly, I'll get right to the bottom line of my tentative conclusion, and then I'll explain how we get there. I'm thinking that with respect to the Portland Police Association's motion to intervene with respect to the remedy phase, I'm going to grant that motion. I believe that I must grant that motion. And, therefore, I'm going to -- my inclination, and then I would be

deferring ruling on the PPA's motion to intervene with respect to liability issues.

With respect to the motion to intervene brought by the AMA Coalition, I am going to deny the motion to intervene on the remedy phase. I'm going to defer ruling on the motion to intervene by the AMA Coalition with respect to liability, just like with the PPA, but I'm going to grant the AMA Coalition what I've been calling in my written opinion that I'll be releasing later today enhanced amicus status. And I'll describe that in a few moments in greater detail, but essentially it will give the AMA Coalition a seat at the table at least for purposes of discussing remedy issues.

Let me explain very briefly what my thinking is here and then where I see this going, and then I'll turn it over to you, as I said.

I start with a statement from the Ninth Circuit, a City of Los Angeles case, and in that statement the Ninth Circuit itself is quoting and citing two U.S. Supreme Court cases. The Local 93 International Association of Firefighters case from the Supreme Court in 1986, and the W.R. Grace v. Local Union 759 case from the U.S. Supreme Court in 1983. Here's what the Ninth Circuit says and attributes to, as legal authority, those two Supreme Court cases: Except as part of court-ordered relief after a judicial determination of liability, an employer cannot unilaterally change a

collective bargaining agreement as a means of settling a dispute over whether the employer has engaged in collective -- excuse me, has engaged in constitutional violations.

So as we look at things here, the City of Portland is the employer, and it has a collective bargaining agreement with the Portland Police Association. There are allegations made by the United States that the City of Portland has engaged in constitutional violations, and this Court does have the authority, by injunctive relief, to change the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, but it can only do so after a judicial determination of liability.

Now, that might occur after a trial on the merits and that might occur even after summary judgment, but it cannot, and the Ninth Circuit has made this clear in the City of Los Angeles case, it cannot occur simply by means of approving a settlement agreement entered into between the United States and the City of Portland if it would result in a change in the collective bargaining agreement between the City of Portland and the Portland Police Association.

So that leads, then, to the question of does it?

Now, I'm not ready to rule on that question, but I will state that for purposes of a motion to intervene, and my comments right now are directed primarily to the Portland Police Association's motion -- I'll get to the Albina

Coalition -- the AMA Coalition motion in a few minutes, but when I looked at intervention as of right, I looked to Rule 24(a)(2), or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (a)(1), which conveys a right to intervene when a statute grants it. That's really not applicable. As everyone recognizes, there's no such statute.

So we look at 24(a)(2). We know the general criteria there is that to intervene as of right an applicant must meet four requirements and must have significant protectable interests relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action. The disposition of the action may -- and I note here the word "may" -- as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest or its interest.

Third, the applicant -- the application is timely.

That's not an issue here. Every application we're

confronted with was within my order regarding the timeliness

of applications.

And then, fourth, the existing parties, United States and the City of Portland, may not adequately represent the applicant's interest.

Now, as applied to the Portland Police Association, here's how I analyze it: The Portland Police Association asserts that it has a significant protectable interest because the terms of the proposed settlement agreement

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conflict with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, what I refer to generally as the labor agreement between the City and the Portland Police Association, and the Portland Police Association contends that the settlement agreement, at least portions of it, infringe on the Portland Police Association's state law bargaining rights. They add that the disposition may impair or impede the Portland Police Association's continuing ability to protect and enforce its contractural rights with the City and that neither the City nor the United States can adequately represent the Portland Police Association's interest, for, among other reasons, the City is the employer of the members of the Police Association, and the City and the Police Association, at least, you know, in name, and probably in reality, are antagonists in the collective bargaining process.

Now, the City concedes that the Portland Police
Association is entitled to intervention as of right, at
least in the remedy phase of litigation, and I agree. The
United States, although it doesn't make that concession,
admits that the PPA, the Portland Police Association, has a
protectable interest in the remedy phase and that, quote, a
small number of the agreements provisions, closed quote, may
be implicated by the settlement agreement, but the United
States argues that the settlement agreement does not impair

the interest of the Portland Police Association because the settlement agreement preserves the Police Association's ability to collectively bargain, grieve, and arbitrate under the collective bargaining agreement.

But it is -- but the settlement agreement, at least as
I read it, does not tell us what happens in the event that
the City and the Portland Police Association might not be
able to reach agreement with respect to any of the disputed
issues or the conflicting issues between the settlement
agreement and the labor agreement, the collective bargaining
agreement.

Now, as I mentioned, the Ninth Circuit in the City of

Los Angeles case has found that the district court does have

the power to override a union's collective bargaining

agreement, but not in the approval of a settlement

agreement, only after a judicial determination of liability.

Now, the United States argues here that the Union's rights, the Police Association's rights, are not impaired for purposes of intervention, because, as speculative, whether the parties will or will not be able to reach agreement or resolve any disputes, but that precise argument was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in the City of Los Angeles case.

Now, I recognize here that the settlement agreement is a bit more ambiguous or perhaps even silent on certain

issues that the Ninth Circuit found troubling. Indeed, dispositive in the City of Los Angeles case.

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However, as I read the proposed settlement agreement in this case, there is still a possibility that certain aspects of the implementation of the settlement agreement could conflict with the collective bargaining rights as set forth in the current version of the labor agreement; that although the parties do continue to retain the right to grieve and to bargain, that ultimately, even under the proposed settlement agreement here, the United States has reserved the right to seek judicial enforcement of the terms of the settlement agreement and therefore that remains the possibility; that if the Police Union and the City are unable to resolve their differences and certainly unable -- if they're unable to resolve their difference in a way that's satisfactory to the United States, the United States has the right, under the settlement agreement, to seek a court order to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement and thereby overrule any inconsistent provisions in the collective bargaining agreement.

And I think that possibility gives the Portland Police Association intervention as of right in this case.

Now, I want to emphasize -- and this is part of where we're going go in the next phase of this litigation. I want to emphasize that I have not concluded that the provisions

of the settlement agreement are inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement, but there certainly appears to be a fair argument to that end made by the Portland Police Association, and that, I believe, is sufficient to confer on the Portland Police Association the right to intervene in this case.

Now, with respect to whether or not there's an impediment or impairment of the Police Association's interests, I also note that the settlement agreement, the proposed settlement agreement, doesn't state -- at least I didn't see it state in this -- that if there were a disagreement or an inability to resolve a grievance or dispute between the Police Association and the City, then the collective bargaining provisions would control. If anything, that seems to be inconsistent with the ability of the United States to seek court injunctive relief to order the City to abide by the settlement agreement if the United States believes and can show that the terms of the settlement agreement have been violated.

Then, finally, with respect to adequacy of representation, at least with respect to the Portland Police Association, the case law recognizes that we are -- at least where union rights or collective bargaining rights are at issue, there's an inadequacy of representation between antagonists, and, in addition, in an employer situation or

an employment situation, there's not a sufficiency of representation.

So that summarizes my view with respect to why the Portland Police Association is going to be afforded intervention as of right, at least with respect to the remedy stage -- and I'm not expressing any opinion right now -- and I'm expressly deferring ruling of their motion to intervene on liability. And we will address that if and when we have to.

Let me now turn briefly to the AMA Coalition and its motion for intervention, either as of right or permissive. I do want to begin by noting that the Court recognizes that the AMA Coalition has dedicated significant time and resources over many years to identifying possible issues and solutions concerning the Police Bureau and alleged practice of using excessive force. I also recognize that the AMA Coalition has extensive community outreach, a deep understanding of the issues, including those raised in this lawsuit and issues that are beyond those that are raised in the complaint in this lawsuit, and the AMA Coalition has an important perspective to bring to the remedy phase of this action -- and I do believe that the AMA Coalition can and will bring a valuable voice to the table during these proceedings as we discuss remedy.

But with respect to the legal requirements on a motion

to intervene, it does appear to me, and it's based upon Ninth Circuit precedent that holds that organizations that have an undifferentiated generalized income -- excuse me, generalized interest in the outcome of an ongoing action or organizations that have an interest comparable to a substantial portion of the population do not have a legally protectable interest for the technical purposes of intervention. And there, of course, I'm citing the Southern California Edison case from the Ninth Circuit.

I also note that the complaint in this case, crafted and filed by the United States, raises issues concerning and alleging unconstitutional practices relating to perceived or actual mental illness or mental crises and it does not contain any allegations or claims of such practices based on race.

The complaint filed by the AMA Coalition suffers from at least two problems. One of which is probably remediable; the other I don't think is.

The first problem is it asserts a claim under §14141, which only allows an action to be brought by the Attorney General in the name of the United States.

So §14141 does not contain a private cause of action and may not be asserted by anyone else, including the AMA Coalition.

I notice that the AMA Coalition acknowledges that and

in its pleadings says that if that's a problem, which it is, it asks for leave to replead and to assert a complaint or claim under §1983. 42 United States Code §1983.

That, however, doesn't solve the problem completely, because anyone certainly may, if they believe that they've got the legal and factual support to file a claim against the City or the Police Bureau or any individual officer alleging a §1983 violation. But in this case the plaintiff, the United States, has chosen to limit its complaint to issues relating to the treatment of those with perceived or actual mental illness or a mental crises. And the AMA Coalition's proposed complaint goes beyond that. It includes issues relating to race.

Now, I am not expressing any opinion at all as to whether or not there should or shouldn't be a complaint dealing with the issues that the AMA Coalition tries to bring in, but that's not this lawsuit, and I must confine myself to the lawsuit here as framed by the plaintiff in this lawsuit, the United States.

Now, the AMA Coalition argues that race is already included in the current lawsuit because the United States raised claims involving race in the Department of Justice's letter of findings, but those letter of findings do not constitute or establish the claims in this lawsuit. The complaint is the operative document that establishes the

scope, reach, and specific claims of this action, and the complaint does not contain any allegations related to excessive force based on race.

In addition, the AMA Coalition further argues that because the proposed settlement agreement contains a requirement that the Police Bureau documents demographic data regarding the subjects of police encounters and because that demographic data documentation will almost certainly include racial identification, therefore, argues the AMA Coalition, that the proposed settlement agreement seeks to address concerns of excessive force based on race.

I think that reads too much into the settlement agreement that's proposed.

The fact that the proposed settlement agreement tasks the Police Bureau with documenting general demographic data on police subjects does not expand the scope of this lawsuit to include claims of excessive force based on race. No such claims are alleged in the complaint filed by the United States. And at least with the lawsuit that's right now in front of me, I'm not going to expand this lawsuit beyond what the plaintiff has alleged in his complaint -- in its complaint.

Now, in terms of adequacy of representation by the existing parties, I know also the United States and the AMA Coalition share the same interest in remedying the alleged

pattern and practice by the Police Bureau of using excessive force in interactions with persons perceived as or actually suffering from mental illness or mental illness -- or mental health crises and that's a further reason to deny intervention as of right.

Now, with respect to permissive intervention, my concern, again, is primarily with the interest of the AMA Coalition in expanding the current lawsuit and its resolution beyond issues relating to mental health and mental illness. As I said, if anyone wants to bring a different lawsuit based on race, they have the legal right to do that. But that's not this lawsuit.

Therefore, I'm denying -- I'm using my discretion and denying the AMA Coalition intervention, even permissively.

However, as I said in the beginning of my comments, I do recognize the expertise, the efforts, and the valuable contributions the AMA Coalition can offer in resolving these issues, the issues raised by the complaint, even if we -- even if we just focus on and confine ourselves to the issues of the treatment of persons suffering from or perceived to be suffering from mental illness. And, therefore, I am granting enhanced amicus curiae, or friend of the court status for the AMA Coalition in at least the following five particulars -- they -- all of this is set forth in my written opinion. And unless someone convinces

me I'm wrong later this morning, you'll have this written opinion before the end of today.

Here are the five particulars that I see for the enhanced amicus curiae status for the AMA Coalition.

First, the AMA Coalition shall have the opportunity to present any briefing requested by the Court or allowed by the Court in the same manner as any of the parties.

Second, the AMA Coalition shall have the opportunity to participate in any oral arguments to the same extent as all of the other parties.

The AMA Coalition -- third, the AMA Coalition may present its arguments from counsel table, along with all other parties.

Fourth, the AMA Coalition may participate in the fairness hearing, to the extent as all other parties.

And, fifth, to the extent that the United States, the City, and the Portland Police Association may participate in mediated settlement discussions under the authority of the Court and a court-appointed special master for settlement purposes -- and I'll discuss that in a few minutes -- the AMA Coalition shall be invited and allowed to participate in those negotiations and discussions.

And, as a matter of fact, from this point forward, I'm going to be collectively referring to the United States, the City, the Portland Police Association, and the AMA Coalition

as the Parties, capital P, even though, technically, the AMA Coalition is, to be precise, only an enhanced amicus.

Now, if this remains my ruling, then where does that take us going forward? And I have a section in my opinion, it begins on page 18, entitled "Directions for Going Forward." And it starts, again, with the following proposition from the Ninth Circuit relying upon unambiguous Supreme Court precedent, and I'll repeat it again. Quote: Except as part of court-ordered relief after a judicial determination of liability, an employer cannot unilaterally change a collective bargaining agreement as a means of settling a dispute over whether the employer has engaged in constitutional violations, closed quote.

I think we all recognize a judicial determination of liability is not simply a conclusion following a fairness hearing that a proposed settlement agreement may be fair, reasonable, and appropriate, a judicial determination of liability requires, at a minimum, summary judgment on the merits concerning liability, or, more likely, if there's contested issues of fact, a trial on the merits on liability.

So with that as a foundation, it looks to me as if there are two questions that I need to answer before I can proceed to a fairness hearing.

Really, there's -- you know, depending on the answer to

one, the first question, there may be two and there may just be one. Here are the two questions as I see it. First:

The Court must determine whether the proposed settlement agreement, in fact, prejudices the legal rights of the Portland Police Association under the labor agreement, under the collective bargaining agreement.

Now, if it doesn't, that's the end of the matter.

We'll proceed to the fairness hearing. But if it does

prejudice the legal rights of the Portland Police

Association under the labor agreement, then I have to then

answer the question as -- the second question, whether that

conclusion necessarily precludes the authority of the Court

to approve the settlement agreement without a prior judicial

determination of liability.

It looks to me that the second question is answered in the affirmative, from the cases that I've read, and that's a number of cases -- one -- a few from the Ninth Circuit and a few from the Supreme Court, but there may be a split among the circuits. I identified, on page 19 of my opinion, several cases from the Tenth Circuit, the Eleventh, the Second and the former Fifth that may shed some light on this. It's sufficiently unclear that if we get to this issue I would want the benefit of briefing from the parties -- and of course I mean all four parties now -- and oral argument on that question.

So, to reiterate, first, does the proposed settlement agreement prejudice the legal rights of the Portland Police Association under the labor agreement -- under the labor agreement; and, second, if it does, does that necessarily preclude us from going forward with the fairness hearing?

Do we need to then go to adjudication of the merits?

Now, we could proceed and start scheduling briefing and analysis on those two questions, but it struck me as perhaps more appropriate, more reasonable, maybe even more efficient, to afford the parties, now that they've had the benefit of this analysis from me, an opportunity to see if mediation can resolve those questions so that we don't need to deal with that, because perhaps mediation might result in an amended proposed settlement agreement, such that all four parties will agree that it does not prejudice the rights of the Portland Police Association under the labor agreement, and, therefore, there's no need to concern ourselves with the hypothetical than the counterfactual hypothetical of, well, what do I do? What am I allowed to do if it were to conflict?

Now, I do want to make something very clear, though, and I know this came up in the United States' brief toward the end, and I agree with it. This is not to say that the Portland Police Association may block such a consent decree merely by withholding its consent now that it is a party for

intervention purposes in the remedy phase.

It may not do that if the Court or the parties have resolved the issues that I've previously identified in my two questions. So that if there is a proposed amended settlement agreement or if I conclude that the settlement agreement, as actually crafted, doesn't violate the rights of the Portland Police Association, the fact that they are now a party by intervention does not mean they have the legal right to block a settlement by withholding their consent. The Supreme Court, frankly, in the Local 93 case, specifically said they do not. Quoting from 478 U.S. at 529 to 530. Quote: While the intervener is entitled to present evidence and have its objections heard at the hearings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does not have the power to block the decree nearly by withholding its consent, closed quote.

The Ninth Circuit, in Southern California Edison, is to the same effect. So the question for me is does the settlement agreement or perhaps an amended settlement agreement interfere or conflict with the rights under the collective bargaining agreement? If it does, then I think we have to address whether I even have the legal authority to approve it. But if it doesn't, then it doesn't matter if not all of the interveners or the Portland Police Bureau consents. So I'm repeating myself. I'll move on.

I do think it would be helpful to see if the parties want to make any changes to the proposed settlement agreement to address these issues, either by agreement or even perhaps without agreement. But I think the most efficient approach is to try to see if they can reach agreement on these issues, and, therefore, I am suggesting that shortly after this hearing the parties meet and see if they can agree on a specific mediator who would then be appointed by the Court to meet with all four parties —
United States, City of Portland, PPA, and AMA Coalition —
to see if there are changes that could or should be made to the proposed settlement agreement, not only to reflect, by the way, the issues that I've raised under the collective bargaining agreement, but to see if the AMA Coalition has any additional suggested changes that might be for the good.

I understand that the United States and the City have already engaged in extensive public solicitation and input and meeting with a number of organizations, and I commend that. But given submissions by the AMA Coalition and my views on the matter so far, I think it would be valuable for this process to ensure that the AMA Coalition could provide input as part of this mediation process.

And so what I'm asking all of the parties to do is to report to me no later than the end of this month,

February 28th: Can all four parties agree on a mediator or

set -- small set -- of mediators? I have occasionally seen mediations and participated in mediations with two or even three mediators. If that's what you all want to do, that's fine with me. But do let me know whether you can agree on a mediator or mediation panel and let me know by February 28th if you can and have agreed. And if you have not agreed or cannot agree, then by February 28th of this year each party must send to me the names of three proposed mediators who are acceptable to that party.

Then I would like to hold a brief status conference to address any remaining issues concerning mediation, the appointment of the mediator, and matters like that.

If the parties are available, I would like to hold it on Tuesday, March 5th, at 12:15. I'm scheduled to be in the middle of a jury trial on a different matter that day, but I'll give you the lunch hour if you are available March 5th at 12:15. If not, let me know, and I'll find you some other time.

I would also direct that if there's going to be a mediation that it be completed in 45 days or -- 45 days from today, or not later than April 5th, 2013.

If you all want to make that date shorter and can agree, let me know. If you all agree that the date should be expanded and the deadline should be expanded and you can all agree, let me know.

I am sensitive that there is a value in moving this process forward and getting to resolution, and so I don't want to let this drag on too long. 45 days seems right to me, but if you all think or agree it should be shorter or longer, I'll be flexible on that.

So that then leads to the question of what happens if there's a mediation and you can't reach an agreement? Or what happens if you can't agree and there's no mediation? Well, then we're back to I need to address these basic questions of does the settlement agreement, either as it currently stands or as the United States and the City may wish to propose an amendment, does that violate the rights of the Portland Police Association; and, if so, what are the consequences for the Court's authority?

And there I would anticipate the following schedule -but, again, if you all think the schedule is either too long
or too short, let me know, and I'll -- I'd like to hear what
you have to say. But I would anticipate -- I would like the
briefing of the parties on those issues as follows: All
four parties can submit their views on that party with a
brief filed on April 19th. And I envision two rounds of
simultaneous briefing.

So I would like your opening thoughts on those two questions by April 19th. And if a party submits an opening brief on April 19th, then they will have the right to

respond, in writing, to the arguments submitted by any other party two weeks, then, thereafter, on May 3rd.

And then, finally, I'd like to hold an oral argument on that question. And the date that looks good for me, but I'll be interested in your input on this, as well, would be Thursday, May 23rd, at 9:00 a.m.

Again, if you are all available for that -- because I think we need to resolve those issues before deciding about scheduling of the fairness hearing if we can go in that direction.

Finally, let me say a few words briefly about the fairness hearing, because I don't think, in light of what I said, it makes sense to go into much more detail about it now. But I'm very appreciative of all the comments that everyone has put in so far about how the fairness hearing should look, how it should be conducted, and how that should be held. Not only the comments from the four parties, but a number of public comments I have received and appreciate.

I am concerned about several things, and my concerns are inconsistent. I'm concerned that there may be people who have difficulty getting to the courthouse in downtown Portland. There may be people who have difficulty getting to the courthouse during normal business hours. At one point I was -- I'm still thinking about possibilities of holding an evening session at the courthouse or a Saturday

session. I am concerned, based upon the security needs and precedent mostly, in terms of how federal courts conduct their business, I don't think I'll be holding a session outside of the courthouse. I don't think that's the right precedent to set.

I'm also concerned a little bit about the finances of evening hearings at the courthouse or on a Saturday. We have to pay courtroom security officers for that. It's not out of the question. It's a possibility. I'm also concerned about some of the arguments that folks have made about need for child care for people who want to testify.

Therefore, the idea I'm thinking about -- again, we don't need to resolve it right now, but the idea that I'm thinking about, to share this with you, is -- well, obviously, anyone who wants to submit written comments can submit written comments, but for those who wish to speak orally about this -- when we have a fairness hearing, the public participation, the folks aren't placed under oath, the folks aren't subject to cross-examination, and one of the suggestions that we received -- and I think, frankly, it came from Ms. Hardesty -- was we could do a number of that testimony by videotape. I think that's a very smart idea.

I don't know whether this would be coordinated by AMA Coalition or by the City or by some combination, but before the actual fairness hearing, folks can appear at a

convenient location and at a convenient time to them, can say what they want to say on a videotape or on a video recording, we can all review it. Whether we review it in advance or watch it all together during a fairness hearing here, we will all get the benefit of their comments for people who don't wish to simply submit something in writing.

That seems, to me, to be an appropriate resolution of the concerns of what do we do about folks that want to say something but either don't want to or can't say something in writing, don't want to or can't appear in downtown Portland or appear during regular business hours. So we can think about that, talk about that further, but I don't think we need to resolve those issues at this time.

Now, I've said an awful lot, and at this time if anyone wants to either comment on anything I've said or -- including, if you want, to tell me that I've made some significant and material errors, either in law or fact, you have the opportunity to do that.

We'll start with the United States, proceed to the City, and then proceed to Portland Police Association, and then to AMA Coalition.

The United States?

MR. GEISSLER: Thank you, Your Honor. We would like to echo the Court's sentiment with respect to the AMA. In fact, we appreciate the depth of understanding that the

AMA and its members possess. Likewise, we also appreciate the PPA members and the depth of understanding that they possess and the contributions they have to offer.

Your Honor, no, we wouldn't waive any specific arguments at this point in time. Your Honor, if we may be so bold as to ask the Court a question to get a better understanding of the parameters of the Court's holding. With respect to the issues that would be the subject of mediation between the PAA, City, and the United States, may we take it that the issues would, one, be limited to the Police Bureau, that is to the exclusion of BOEC, which is the 911 dispatchers for the City, and to the exclusion of Community Mental Health, and may we further take it that there would be a limitation as to what is the subject of mandatory bargaining versus permissive bargaining under the state's labor laws, such that the PPA would be required to show that the subject for which they want to intervene have an interest. That is within mandatory bargaining.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me answer that as follows: My main concern with respect to the PPA issues is that the tentative analysis that I have is that if the settlement agreement were to be implemented as currently drafted and if there were to be conflicts in implementation as the City and the Portland Police Association were to move forward in

collective bargaining with respect to some aspects of the implementation of the settlement agreement, and if they were unable to resolve that, then, to the extent that the United States were to bring a motion in this Court under its supervisory authority under the settlement agreement, to enforce the settlement agreement, we would have a conflict in that I do not believe that in the context of approving a settlement agreement or having approved a settlement agreement I could then order changes be made to the collective bargaining agreement. That's why I have concerns about the agreement as currently crafted.

If those concerns either are incorrect or can be addressed with a modification to the settlement such that the Portland Police Association's collective bargaining rights would be preserved and not infringed upon, that takes care of that problem.

Or the other way to proceed is that to whatever extent the United States may wish to have the collective bargaining agreement modified in order to accomplish its objectives in this lawsuit, and I know that there's some beginning discussions already taking place, as the parties have told me, between the City and United States, perhaps those can be expedited, accelerated, and concluded, so that those issues that may pose a problem can be addressed before we have to deal with the fairness hearing and the question of whether

or not I can approve the proposed settlement agreement or an amended proposed settlement agreement.

So to that extent I'm not going to artificially cabin what the parties want to discuss in mediation, but I think you all have an idea now of what my concerns would be so that even if you can't reach agreement on everything and still have some remaining disputes, some of those disputes may not affect my legal ability to approve a settlement agreement if I conclude it's otherwise fundamentally fair reasonable, and appropriate. But some of the disputes might, and those would be the disputes that you might wish to focus on.

Whether or not you can resolve or want to resolve other matters, I think, in the first instance, I should leave that to the parties. And that leads me to the AMA Coalition, because some of the issues of the AMA Coalition, at least those relating to mental health, either the reality of or perception of mental health issues, may have -- may very well wish to be addressed by the parties now rather than here, perhaps quite legitimate issues, at a fairness hearing down the road.

So even though it's not necessary to address those issues now in order to deal with my concerns over legal authority, if we were to reach a stage where a fairness hearing were to raise quite serious issues with the

reasonableness or fairness or appropriateness and reasonableness of the settlement agreement, why not deal with them now?

And so that's the best guidance that I can provide at this time without unreasonably cabining what those voluntary discussions might be on the parties.

I know I'm not really answering your question in full, but that's as much of an answer that I think is appropriate to give at this time.

Anything further, Mr. Geissler?

MR. GEISSLER: Your Honor, if I may, would the Court permit briefing on the issue of the areas that are within mandatory versus permissive bargaining under the state's labor laws, as we find unclear right now the PPA's assertion that the nonexhaustive list attached to its brief sets forth the areas that should be the subject of mediation?

THE COURT: The short answer to that question is yes. But it's a matter of timing. That's what I'm talking about, in large part, when I scheduled the April 19th briefing schedule. But I don't think it's a good idea -- you all can try to talk me out of it if you want, but my initial thinking is why should I resolve some of those legal questions now that the parties, when they talk to each other, might be able to resolve themselves? And I

will then only have to resolve those issues that the parties can't resolve themselves.

I recognize that there were pages and pages in tabular form by the Portland Police Association that they contend are provisions of the labor agreement that were -- that may be impaired by the settlement agreement.

I also see the United States used -- the phrase used in your brief -- there's only a small number of those that really may be impaired.

Well, why don't you try to resolve all of those that the parties can resolve right now, and if there are any that remain, that the parties cannot resolve and that require the Court's rulings, that remain, all right, that's what that April 19th briefing is for.

But I think it's more efficient for you all to communicate and see how much you can resolve. You might be able to resolve all of them or come up with a process to resolve all of them, and you might not. And if you can't, that's what I envision with my April 19th briefing. And then you can let me know whether you're able to resolve some and therefore propose an amended proposed settlement agreement or not.

That's how I -- that's how I think it would be more efficient.

First, does the United States disagree with that, or

should we give that a try?

MR. GEISSLER: Your Honor, I believe that we would want to have some internal deliberations; but, if I understand Your Honor properly, the direction from the Court is that we attempt mediation before we proceed with briefing.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GEISSLER: I believe we find that a well-founded suggestion. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes. And that's why what I envision is let me know by February 28th if you can agree on a mediator. If you can send me the names of each party of three people that are acceptable. And assuming that dates work for you all, we'll have a brief status conference on March 5th, Tuesday, at 12:15, and then we'll see if we can get mediation completed hopefully by April 5th.

That basically gets you a month to get that done. But if not or if there's still remaining issues that need to be briefed, that's what the April 19th is for.

And, by the way, if you all can agree and want to propose an alternative schedule, I'm certainly open to that. But I thought that the most efficient thing for me to do is to put something on the table first.

Before turning to the City, anything further from the United States?

MR. GEISSLER: Yes, Your Honor. We'd appreciate direction from the Court as to the cost of the mediator or mediators. If the Court would anticipate that the Court's funds would be sufficient to cover those costs, we would appreciate that notation now.

THE COURT: Let's discuss that on March 5th. I don't know the answer to that.

MR. GEISSLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything from the City now?

MR. VAN DYKE: I just want to be -- thank you,

Your Honor. I don't -- I don't have any particular comments
on the proposed Court's order, which we'll look at in more
detail later today. I just want to let the Court know that
there's a number of moving pieces going on simultaneously at
the City. We have a budget with a large hole to cut and
we -- some of those cuts will probably -- although I'm not
going to make that decision -- be directed to the Portland
Police Bureau. We have collective bargaining talks started
with the Union, and we also have this proceeding going on.

It's very hard for me to figure out exactly how all those moving pieces are going to fit at one time, and I just want to let Your Honor know that the decisions that the City might make, in terms of budget or in terms of collective bargaining agreement, we're going to have to make -- we may have to make some of those before we get back in front of

Your Honor and rule -- we're not trying to preempt

Your Honor's ruling in any way or tilt the playing field,
but we will have to go forward on those, as well.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Van Dyke. I fully appreciate that. That's why I also suggest if you all want to propose alternative schedules, let me know. My assumption was the parties wanted to move forward with this process with dispatch and diligence; but, to the extent you all want to propose alternatives, you're welcome to do that.

I completely agree that and see that we probably are balancing multiple issues simultaneously. And that's why I thought the approach that I've outlined here, at least from my perspective, is the best way to try to accomplish dealing with that, rather than dealing with things in isolation. I'm fully appreciative of what you're saying, and I recognize that.

Let me hear next from the Portland Police Association.

MR. KARIA: Thank you, Your Honor. I have no particular comment at this time on the proposed scheduling going forward.

One question, though, for Your Honor is at what juncture do you anticipate needing to revisit the deferred question of liability as it pertains to the intervention motions by both PPA and the AMA Coalition?

THE COURT: If a fairness hearing does not result

in the approval of a settlement agreement. If I don't have the legal authority to approve the settlement agreement, as I previously outlined, well, then, I can't approve a settlement agreement.

Even if I do have the legal authority, if I conclude that it's not fundamentally fair, reasonable, and appropriate, and I therefore disapprove of it, well, we then may need to deal with litigation on the merits of the underlying claim. In which case, before we address the questions of what discovery, if any, do any parties want, and before we address whether or not this can or should be resolved on summary judgment or a bench trial, we would need to address the question of which parties are going to be in by intervention.

And by that point I would allow both Portland Police
Association and the AMA Coalition to renew their motions to
intervene on the liability phase.

Does that answer that question?

MR. KARIA: Yes, sir. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything further from the Portland Police Association?

MR. KARIA: No, sir.

THE COURT: Let me hear from the AMA Coalition, if you wish.

MS. ALBIES: Thank you, Your Honor. We certainly

appreciate the Court's recognition of the AMA's contributions to police oversight in Portland and the many years of experience and the depth of knowledge that it brings.

In terms of the adequacy of representation, the DOJ, representing the AMA Coalition's point of view, I just want to make very clear that the AMA, while we certainly appreciate the work that the DOJ has put in, the community that the AMA represents has a very different perspective having been subjected to excessive force by the Portland Police Bureau, so we bring that perspective, and, again, I appreciate the Court recognizes that.

And so I would contest that we have a generalized interest, because it's a very specific interest based on people who have been subjected to excessive force and been targeted by the Police Bureau.

And in terms of the Court's comments that the AMA sought to or seeks to expand the suit beyond the scope of the complaint, obviously, as clear from our briefing, the AMA -- one of the AMA's primary concerns was that race was not addressed in this suit, and obviously that's a different discussion for a different day, unfortunately that -- that it's not addressed in the suit. But, again, we understand that as -- as the parameters of the suit and the parameters law.

And I will note that the AMA is committed to what this suit does seek to address. It does not seek to expand it.

And to the extent that the AMA's participating in any future proceedings, that we intend to push the Department of Justice and the City and all the parties to make this agreement as strong as possible to make sure it has the broadest effect and as strong as it possibly can be.

With that said, we don't seek to expand the suit, and we -- we just seek to strengthen what's going on. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Can everyone make and -- yeah?

MR. GEISSLER: Sorry, Your Honor. May I ask one more question?

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. GEISSLER: In response to Mr. Karia's question, Your Honor said that the Court would revisit the issue of the merits motion if the Court could not approve a final settlement agreement. Your Honor, my concern is, only to be cautious, not at all to -- to indicate a current or future position for the United States, but in a -- in an attempt to be cautious, it appears that the settlement agreement determination would occur more than 60 days out from today, the date of today's ruling, which would indicate that time in which a party could appeal would pass on the

60th day.

In order that we preserve the right to appeal, the intervention of right on the PPA on the current grounds, remedy grounds, may I ask the Court to extend by its order the date of appeal to whatever date is finally used for the final determination on the settlement agreement?

THE COURT: To the extent I have the authority to do that, yes, I do that right now. To the extent, I don't, I'll let you all worry about that. If you want a 1292 or some type of other interlocutory order, submit something, and I'll make sure that the United States has its right to appeal.

To the extent that's within my authority to extend, I so extend.

MR. GEISSLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Can folks meet in a brief status conference here on Tuesday, March 5th, at 12:00? Will that work?

MR. GEISSLER: Your Honor, for the United States, may I appear by telephone, since I arrived from D.C. and my colleagues, I'm sure, will appear in person?

THE COURT: Yes. I'm desirous of not wanting to excluded the public from any of these proceedings, otherwise I would suggest we have an in chambers telephone conference, but I'll be in open court. I would like to see if people

are available locally, they can be in open court. But anyone who needs to appear by telephone, just let

Mary Austad, our courtroom deputy, know. We'll be here in open court but will be able to receive, by telephone, any participation from anyone who must and desires to participate by telephone.

MS. BROWN: Your Honor, for the United States,
Adrian Brown and Bill Williams will be available in person.

MR. VAN DYKE: The City is available on that date.

MR. KARIA: The Association is available, sir.

MS. ALBIES: Somebody from the AMA will be available.

THE COURT: Very good. We'll have the next status conference, Tuesday, March 5th, 2013, at 12:15 p.m. In addition, please remember to let me know, and you can do this by email to our courtroom deputy, Mary Austad, her email is found on the court's website under my name. Just send Mary an email letting me know if -- by February 28th if you all agreed on a mediator or mediation panel; or, if you've been unable to agree, please give Mary three names of mediators who will be acceptable to your client or to each individual parties separately.

All right. Is there anything else anyone wants me to address in this morning's hearing?

For the United States?

MR. GEISSLER: Nothing more, Your Honor. THE COURT: The City? MR. VAN DYKE: Nothing more, Your Honor. THE COURT: PPA? MR. KARIA: No, sir. THE COURT: AMA Coalition? MS. ALBIES: No. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you all very much, and thank you all for the excellent briefing, too. It's very helpful. I expect you will have my final written decision by 11:00 a.m. It will be issued in the MC/ECF system by 11:00 this morning. MR. GEISSLER: Thank you, Your Honor. DEPUTY COURTROOM CLERK: Court's in recess. (Hearing concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature, conformed signature, or digitally signed signature is not certified.

/s/Jill L. Erwin

Jill L. Erwin, RMR, CRR Date: February 26, 2013 Official Court Reporter